Abstract This paper describes a technique for runtime monitoring (RM) and runtime verification (RV) of systems with invisible events and data artifacts. Our approach combines well-known hidden markov model (HMM) techniques for learning and subsequent identification of hidden artifacts, with runtime monitoring of probabilistic formal specifications. The proposed approach entails a process in which the end-user first develops and validates deterministic formal specification assertions, s/he then identifies hidden artifacts in those assertions. Those artifacts induce the state set of the identifying HMM. HMM parameters are learned using standard frequency analysis techniques. In the verification or monitoring phase, the system emits visible events and data symbols, used by the HMM to deduce invisible events and data symbols, and sequences thereof; both types of symbols are then used by a probabilistic formal specification assertion to monitor or verify the system.
Introduction
A hidden markov model (HMM) can be considered a state machine in which state transitions and state outputs, or observations, are probabilistic. HMMs are used to learn and classify sequences of observables. HMM technology has been used successfully in a diverse set of applications, such as speech recognition [1, 18] , gene prediction [20] , and cryptanalysis [22] .
Because of the probabilistic nature of the underlying process being observed by HMMs, they are not used often to recognize long-periodic sequences. Rather, HMM's are mostly used as discriminators to determine whether one HMM is better than another. For example, an HMM-based speech recognition system may have each HMM represent a word, with run time voice recognition choosing the HMM that best fits the incoming sequence of speech features. This is in contrast with deterministic finite automata (DFA) [13] , finite state machines (FSMs) [15] , or statechart assertions [2, 3] , which are often used to identify and classify individual sequences.
Runtime verification (RV) of formal specification assertions is a class of methods for monitoring the sequencing and temporal behavior of an underlying application and comparing it to the correct behavior as specified by a formal specification pattern. Some published RV tools and techniques are: the TemporalRover and DBRover [4] , PaX [12] and RT-Mac [21] , all of which use extensions and variants of propositional linear-time temporal logic (PLTL) as the specification language of choice. The StateRover [23] uses deterministic and non-deterministic statechart diagrams as its specification language. In [2, 3] , Drusinsky describes the application of RV using statechart assertions to the verification of DoD and NASA applications, and to those of the Brazilian Space agency.
In [6] , the authors present a visual tradeoff space, called the formal validation and verification (FV&V) tradeoff cuboid, which qualitatively compares three categories of FV&V techniques: model checking (MC), theorem proving (TP), and RV combined with automatic test generation (ATG). The tradeoff space compares the cost and test-space coverage associated with these three categories of techniques. This tradeoff space highlights the wide spectrum of systems for which RV has a favorable cost-coverage ratio.
While conventional RV operates on sequences of deterministic observations, this paper suggests a technique for performing RV on sequences of deterministic and stochastic (invisible) observations. The technique combines hidden markov models (HMMs) with probabilistic RV of formal specification assertions. Throughout the paper, we will be using the Statechart assertion formal specification language of [2, 3] .
Our proposed hybrid technique is suitable for the verification of complex systems in which visible data do not necessarily contain all the information required for monitoring a system, its health, or for verifying its behavior. It is also suitable for monitoring the behavior of systems that are not fully accessible, such as the verification of flight software using telemetry files, monitoring safety rules for nuclear facilities, monitoring operational rules for unmanned vehicles, and for forensic applications, such as behavioral analysis of a post-accident aircraft or automotive system using black-box information. On-going research is applying the technique to runtime intrusion detection, where the only visible information available in runtime consists of IP-addresses and ports, yet an intelligent intrusion detection monitor would need to assert about the nature of the attacker, such as its affiliation with a foreign military. In a recent article [5] , the PI demonstrated the effectiveness of such monitoring for monitoring financial transactions.
The technique in this paper is not positioned as a statistical method in and by itself. Hence for example, it does not improve known HMM parameter estimation techniques, such as estimating HMM probabilities or number of states. Rather, the technique suggested in this paper is positioned as a hybrid pattern monitoring and detection technique that combines patterns (also known as rules) written by humans with statistical observations-manifested as HMMs. In other words, our technique is positioned as a hybrid between RV and statistical pattern detection.
The example outlined in this paper is that of monitoring a behavioral rule utilizing an approximated observation based on a less reliable measurement. We will be using a traffic light controller (TLC) example as a running example throughout the paper. In this example, the rule to be monitored asserts about a vehicle's speed, yet the TLC, not having a direct speed measurement must approximate it using a measurement of the frequency of cars going over a sensor. The problem being addressed by this paper is that of monitoring the behavioral rule under such circumstances. Clearly, we could perform a crude approximation based on the average distance between cars, which would induce a mean of the speed random variable as a function of the frequency measurement; we would then perform standard (deterministic) RV using a sequence of such mean values as input. Our hybrid monitoring technique relies on the fact that HMMs yield a compound estimation (state and probability) over the use of crude mean values. This will enable subsequent RV to flag scenarios of interest that would otherwise not be flagged because they are less probable than the scenario that consists of mean values alone. For example, our technique could announce "TLC safety pattern of interest flagged with .037 probability"; in contrast, deterministic RV using mean values which effectively uses 0.5 probability as the one and only threshold for determining pattern detection.
While HMM parameter estimation (also known as HMM training) is a difficult problem, our method of using HMMs enables simple parameter estimation, including the generation of the HMM state set, which is driven directly from the rule of interest.
It is well accepted that in spite of HMM accuracy limitations, they are capable of providing an accuracy that is superior to that of plain mean values. Nevertheless, a well-known concern is whether one can have sufficient confidence in the trained parameters for his or her particular HMM application [17] . While this concern is relevant to our technique, our technique enjoys two mitigating factors. First, as elaborated in Sect. 3.2, our HMM application differs from the most HMM applications in that the HMM state-set is known, thereby rendering the estimation of the remaining HMM parameters relatively simple and accurate. Second, the purpose of our hybrid RV technique is to enable an RV tool to detect scenarios of interest that occur at a lower probability than the scenario that consists of mean values; once detected, these sequences are further scrutinized by a human member of the verification team. If for some reason the HMM is inaccurate, the worst outcome is the generation of some additional V&V work (to analyze the detected scenario), but it will not affect the runtime operation of any system. Moreover, the verification oracle can change the probability threshold for scenario detection, where a probability threshold of 0.5 effectively switches-off the HMM.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of RV using UML-based statechart assertions and of HMMs and HMM related algorithms. Section 3 describes all aspects of the hybrid RV approach. Finally, Sect. 4 contains an evaluation whereby our hybrid-monitoring technique is compared with two alternative techniques. 
Overview
In this section, we overview the two techniques used by our hybrid technique namely, RV and HMMs.
2.1 RV of (deterministic) formal specification assertions Runtime verification is a light-weight formal verification technique in which the runtime execution of a system is monitored and compared to an executable version of the system's formal specification. In other words, RV behaves as an automated observer of the program's behavior and compares that behavior with the expected behavior per the formal specification.
The following formal specification example will be used throughout the rest of the paper.
Consider the following TLC requirement R1: whenever vehicle speed in the Main direction is greater than 42 km/h for more than 2 consecutive minutes while lights in the Main direction are green, then lights in that direction should turn red within 30 s afterwards. Figure 1 depicts a statechart assertion for R1. As described in [2, 3] , a statechart assertion is a UML state-machine augmented with a Java action language and a built in Boolean flag named bSuccess, whose value indicates whether the assertion is succeeding (e.g., the input scenario conforms to R1) or failing (e.g., the input requirement violates R1).
The statechart assertion of Fig. 1 Figure 2 illustrates the conventional RV architecture: an executable formal specification assertion observes inputs and outputs of the SUT (the TLC in our example), and compares those sequences to the expected behavior; whenever that actual behavior violates the requirement, the specification announces a failure. Figure 3 depicts two timeline diagrams of validation tests for the assertion of Fig. 1 Validation testing is an important step in the process because the formal-specification assertion is to be trusted to represent requirement R1 in the subsequent automated pattern-recognition, monitoring, or verification phase, discussed below 1 .
Verification is performed by comparing a trace of the system (e.g., as captured by a log file) to the behavior of the assertion set. The StateRover tool [23] does so using a twostep process. First, the log file is converted into an equivalent JUnit test [14] , and the assertion is code-generated into an equivalent Java class (details about this code generator are available in [2] ). Next comes the RV step in which the JUnit test is executed, thereby checking that the log-file trace conforms to the requirement as manifested by the assertion.
The extended-RV technique suggested in this paper uses the same process for the development and validation of assertions, i.e., assertions are developed as deterministic assertions. However, rather than performing deterministic RV by the virtue of using an assertion code generator that generates a deterministic implementation, our technique performs probabilistic RV using a special assertion code generator that generates a probabilistic, weighted implementation. Specific details are provided in Sect. 3.3.
Hidden markov models
A (discrete) HMM is a statistical Markov model in which the system being modeled is assumed to be a Markov process with unobserved, or hidden states. While in a regular Markov model, the state is directly visible to the observer, in a hidden Markov model the state is not directly visible, while the output that is dependent on the state is visible. 1 Further details about validation testing are available in [3] .
Throughout this paper, we will be using standard conditional probability notation, where P[a|b] denotes the probability of event a given b.
The parameters of a simple HMM are:
• N , the number of states in the model. where The most well-known algorithms used to solve these problems are:
1. The forward algorithm, for calculating the forward vari-
The forward algorithm is a dynamic programming algorithm based on the recurrence:
α is the normalized version of α:
The algorithm is a dynamic programming algorithm based on the recurrence:
. . , 1, and 1 ≤ i ≤ N , with the initialization: 3. The forward-backward algorithm, for calculating the forward-backward variable
γ can also be expressed as:
The Viterbi algorithm, for calculating the best state sequence that explains an observation sequence,
, and uses the following recursive formula:
. along with the following formula, used to recover the actual most probable state sequence:
The Viterbi algorithm is essentially the forward algorithm with a recurrence in which a max operator is used instead of the sum. The probability of best state sequence
The most probable state sequence q 1 , q 2 , . . . q T is calculated in a backward manner, using q t−1 = ψ t (q t ), and
Hybrid RV of Systems with Hidden States
This section describes all aspects of the suggested hybrid monitoring technique using our TLC example. Section 3.1 describes the architecture of the hybrid monitor, and provides details of the HMM used in the example. Section 3.2 describes how such an HMM is generated (HMM parameter estimation); it also describes the workflow process for developing all components of the hybrid RV system. Section 3.3 describes our generic probabilistic RV algorithm; it is generic because of the availability of a plurality of techniques for generating the probability of a hidden artifact; some of which are discussed in Sect. 3.5. Section 3.4 extends the approach from TLC Sensors Formal spec. assertion ( Fig. 1 ) with weighted implementation (described in section 3.3)
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Success score [0..1] Fig. 4 The RV architecture for the TLC and requirement R1 when the Speed input is hidden statechart assertion rules with hidden conditions (but deterministic events) to statechart assertion rules that may contain hidden events. Section 3.6 extends the technique to cater for continuous observables.
Hybrid RV: RV of systems with hidden states
Suppose our TLC is being monitored or verified. Suppose also that, as assumed by the statechart assertion of Fig. 1 , it emits 3 color change events: (lightTurnedRed, lightTurnedGreen, andlightTurnedYellow), but it does not have a Speed input or output. Instead, the TLC has input sensors that measure the frequency of cars going through the junction in a particular direction (e.g., in the Main direction). In other words, the frequency measurement is an observable whereas speed is a hidden artifact.
To enable RV of the TLC with respect to rule R1 and its corresponding statechart assertion, we modify the architecture of Fig. 2 as depicted in Fig. 4 . This architecture differs from the conventional RV architecture of Fig.1 in three main aspects:
1. It contains a HMM, used to decode the probability of occurrence of sequences of hidden Speed states given sequences of the frequency observable. This HMM provides a plurality of weighted Speed inputs to the statechart assertion, instead of a unique un-weighted Speed input used in Fig. 1 . Details of the HMM are discussed below. 2. It uses a special code generator that generates a probabilistic implementation for the statechart assertion(s), one that operates on the weighted inputs from the HMM. 3. It evaluates the assertion using a success score in the range [0, 1].
In our example, the visible frequency measurement pertains to a sensor under the Main Street that measures the frequency of cars driving over the sensor. The sensor produces symbols, f 1 , f 2 While we could use the above-mentioned stationary process to deduce the hidden Speed value-range from the visible frequency measurement, it does not account for dynamic aspect of the system. It does not account for the fact that distances between cars change with car-speed, rendering the 4 m per car estimate inaccurate.
Consequently, we use an HMM to model this random process. Figure 5 and Table 1 depict an HMM for the TLC example. Its parameters are:
• The state set Q consists of three states that correspond with Speed, namely, HIGH, MED, and LOW, also denoted as states 0, 1, and 2, respectively. Note that it is not a coincident that the HMM states capture the hidden variable in the assertion of Fig. 1 The method for generating these HMM parameters (probabilities of transitions, observations, and initial state distribution) is explained in Sect. 3.2.
RV now proceeds according to the process illustrated in Fig. 4 , as follows. Sampled frequency values are periodically fed into the HMM, which then executes a probability estimation algorithm, such as the forward-algorithm for the current iteration (Sect. 3.5 discusses three probability estimation techniques). These probability values represent probabilities of the HMM being in states HIGH, MED, and LOW, respectively. This vector of symbols and corresponding probabilities is passed to the assertion's implementation code, which executes a weighted version of a state-machine state change, detailed in Sect. 3.3. Finally, as discussed in Sect. 3.3, the assertion announces the probability of a requirement violation.
A more realistic HMM for deducing car speed is one in which the observable frequency is a continuous random variable (called Frequency), e.g., with a normal distribution whose probability density function (PDF) has a normal distribution f O (o) ∼ N (μ, σ 2 ), rather than a plain categorical distribution. Using the TLC example again, the probability estimation algorithm of choice (elaborated in Sect. 3.5) will use f Frequency (frequency, j), the Frequency PDF in state j, instead of the scalar b j (frequency), as shown in Table 2. 3.2 From assertions to HMM parameter estimation HMM parameter estimation, i.e., estimating the transition probability, probability of state observations, and initial state distribution, is a difficult problem. In particular, it is difficult to estimate the number of HMM states, the extreme cases being using one state (i.e., reducing the HMM to a stationary process) or n states, n being the length of the observation sequence.
In our case, however, HMM states are known; they are directly related to the hidden artifacts in the assertions. For example, in the TLC case, the three hidden symbols pertain to Speed values HIGH, MED, LOW, which are derived from Fig. 1 and its requirement R1, as well as from an assertion for the following requirement:
R2: if vehicle speed in the Main direction is between 15 and 40 km/h for more than 2 consecutive minutes while lights in the Main direction are green, then lights should remain green for a total of 4 min. Figure 6a depicts a statechart assertion for requirement R2, and Fig. 6b depicts a timeline diagram for a validation test for this assertion (for assuring that the diagram of Fig.  6a conforms to the spirit and letter of the natural language in R2).
Our use-case for HMMs is simpler than usual in one additional aspect: calculating transition and observable probabilities. Because HMM states relate to real world artifacts (e.g., car speed values), we can conduct learning-phase experiments which measure relative frequencies, such as one in which all speeds and sensor frequencies are measured on a 1-s period basis; all HMM probabilities follow trivially.
Suppose all 1-s measurements are written into a table with two columns: f (for measured frequency) and ss (for corresponding measured speed state, namely LOW, MED, or HIGH). Let N be the total number of rows in this table. Let ss(i) and f (i) be the ss and f column cells of row i, respectively. In this case:
• HMM state set is driven by the requirements, as discussed earlier.
• The probability of the HMM transition between states s and r (e.g., LOW→MED) is calculated as: #(s • The initial state distribution probability π = {π j } has π i as the number times a row i satisfies ss(i) = s j , divided by N , each instance counted for the possibility of an experiment that begins with that particular speed range.
Consequently, we can deduce the workflow for developing the components of the architecture of Fig. 4 , as depicted in Fig. 7 .
RV of assertions with probabilistic inputs: the algorithm
Using the architecture of Fig. 4 , the formal specification assertion module observes the sequences that consist of visible as well as hidden artifacts; in Fig. 1 A weighted/probabilistic implementation of the statechart assertion module of Fig. 4 responds to an input sequence I =< S 1 , P 1 >, < S 2 , P 2 >, . . . , < S T , P T >, where S t is a visible or hidden artifact (i.e., event such a clockTick, or data artifact, i.e., variable, such as Speed, both in Fig. 1) , and P t is the POD of S t . Perform probabilistic RV/RM based on architecture of Fig. 4 English requirement
We use the UML notation for S t , S t = event t [condition t ], where condition t is optional; event t and condition t can either or both be visible or hidden.
An assertion's implementation consists of a collection C of instances, or copies, of the assertion, called configurations. Each configuration executes as a standalone assertion and preserves its own present-state. Each configuration Con has a probability measure P(Con), called the configuration probability measure (CPM), that measures the probability the assertion is behaving as suggested by Con, i.e., that its present-state is Con's present state.
Upon startup, C consists of a single configuration Con de f ault whose present-state, denoted PS(Con de f ault ), is the assertion's default state (e.g., state Init in Fig. 1 ), and having P(Con de f ault )=1.
All configurations of C respond to a pair < S t , P t > of I , by substituting the present configuration Con with two configurations: Con1 and Con2, whose present-state probabilities are calculated by evaluating the outgoing transitions from each configuration as follows. If P t = 1 then the configuration performs a conventional state machine state change upon input S i , such as SpeedHigh → timeout Fire SpeedHighFor2Min, in Fig. 1 . Otherwise, either event t or condition t are hidden. In this case, the configuration Con is replaced with two new configurations: Con1 andCon2,whose respective states and associated probabilities are calculated as follows:
Probabilities:
• If event t is hidden (as elaborated in Sect. 3.4) then:
P(Con1) = P(Con)*P t and P(Con2) = P(Con)*(1-P t ).
• If condition t is hidden, then we first calculate P(condition t ), the probability of the condition, as a function of the probabilities of its constituent variables using standard probability techniques. For example, if condition t is Speed = HIGH || Speed = MED then P(condition t ) = P(Speed = HIGH) + P(Speed = MED), where each term is taken from the POD at time t, such as 0.72 and 0.2, respectively-assuming POD-1.
Consequently, we set P(Con1) = P(Con)P(condition t ), and P(Con2) = P(Con)(1 − P(condition t )).
States: let PS(Con) denote Con's present-state. PS(Con1) and PS(Con2) are determined as follows:
• If event t is hidden (as elaborated in Sect. 3.4) then PS(Con1) is the next state determined by the assertion's transition out of PS(Con), i.e., assuming the event t fired, whereas PS(Con2) is assigned PS(Con), i.e., assuming event t did not fire.
• If condition t is hidden (e.g., Speed==HIGH condition in Fig. 1 For the sake of simplicity, we disallow assertions in which both event t and condition t are hidden.
C configurations are routinely (i.e., every cycle t) managed as follows. All configurations Con with the same present-state 4 are merged into a single configuration Con merged , using the sum of all P(Con') as P(Con merged ).
The statechart assertion declares a probability of failure (POF), i.e., the probability its corresponding requirement has been violated, on a cycle by cycle basis, being the sum of all P(Con) for all configurations Con such that PS(Con) is an error state.
Note that statechart assertions typically have error states that are sink states, i.e., states with no outgoing transitions.
RV of assertions with hidden events
UML statecharts, message sequence diagrams (MSCs), and other formalisms are intrinsically event driven. In fact, the statechart assertions of Figs. 1 and 6a are event driven, using events such as lightsTurnedRed and the 1Hz clockTick event. However, as presented in Sect. 3.1, HMM symbols are propositional in nature, manifested as the states of the HMM, such as the Speed variable. Consequently, the assertions of Figs. 1 and 6a must poll the Speed variable using the 1 Hz clockTick event. In contrast, Fig. 8 depicts an event driven assertion for requirement R1; it uses hidden events speedChangedTo-HIGH and speedChangedFromHIGH.
The probability of these two events is induced by the probability of an HMM transition from state i to state j being traversed at time t, i.e., by ξ t (i, j). Hence, their probabilities are:
Generating the Probability of Occurrence of a Hidden Artifact
We propose three techniques for estimating the POD at time t: the alpha, gamma, and delta methods, as follows.
• The alpha method, which uses N values of α t (i), one per symbol
In other words, δ t "(i) is a normalized version of δ t '(i), which in turn is the probability of the HMM generating symbol s i at time t, via the most probable state sequence, given the observation.
The gamma method is a backward-forward algorithm; it, therefore, requires the entire observable sequence O 1 O 2 . . . O T for the evaluation of γ t (i) for t ≤ T. The alpha and delta methods, on the other hand, are forward algorithms and, therefore, do not require future information for the calculation of α t (i) and δ t (i). Nevertheless, scaling issues discussed below effectively imply that no matter what method is used, it can only be used verbatim with a limited number of observables. Later in section, we suggest one possible remedy to this limitation.
When the HMM contains transitions with probability 0, then the α and γ methods might induce sequences of symbols that cannot be physically generated. For example, consider an HMM with N = 3 and a 1,2 = 0, and suppose γ t (1) = 0.3 and γ t+1 (2) = 0.2; An assertion then considers the sequence s 1 , s 2 as possible.
All three methods suffer from inherent scaling problems, because the calculation of α t (i), γ (i), and δ t "(i) generates values that potentially scale down geometrically with t 5 There are published numerical techniques designed to mitigate this problem, such as [16] ; nevertheless, this constraint limits the length of the sequence of observ-
. . O T , and its corresponding sequence
Meanwhile, the RV process, in of as itself, is not necessarily limited in duration, and might continue working for intervals longer than T.
The trivial approach to the scaling problem is to repeatedly perform RV using a sequence of frames of observables of length T . This approach, however, introduces an error or noise every time we reload the frame buffer.
To somewhat circumvent this problem, we propose the following smoothing approach in which we use two partially overlapping buffers of observables of length T . 
. Now suppose we are using the gamma method, we apply it to each buffer, resulting in γ 1 (t) and γ 2 (t), respectively. Finally, we use the average of these two γ values as our actual γ value.
RV of assertions with hidden continuous data
Recall that requirement R1 asserts about vehicle speed greater than 42 km/h, and R2 asserts about its speed being 5 Although all PODs are normalized (e.g., 1≤i≤N α t (i) = 1, for all t), its possible that the POD in one or more states scales down geometrically with t.
between 15 and 30 km/h. However, the matching statechart assertions of Fig. 1 and Fig. 6a An additional drawback of this approach is that the random variable being asserted about (Speed, in the TLC case) typically has a more complex distribution than the simplistic Categorical distribution.
Suppose that TLC Speed is not the HMM state, but a random variable associated with the state, one with a continuous distribution such as a normal distribution. Table 3 example lists the parameters of the Speed random variable distribution for the TLC example.
Using this framework, we can now use a variant of the assertion of Fig. 1 that uses transition conditions Speed>42 and Speed≤42 instead of Speed=HIGH and Speed =HIGH, respectively, thus addressing the letter of requirement R1.
Let Speed(t,i) denote a random variable representing Speed when the HMM is in state i at timet. We assume that its distribution is time independent and, therefore, write Speed(i); its cumulative distribution-function (CDF) is F Speed(i) (speed) = P(Speed ≤ speed|q t = s i , λ). Note that, as prescribed in Table 3 , Speed(i) is independent of the observables (sensor frequency measurements), given the present state s i .
We now define modified variables α, β, and γ , as expressions rather than literal numbers, as follows:
, the last equality results from Speed(i) being independent of the observables. Hence: 
The RV process of Sect. 3.3 is modified as follows. In addition to using the alpha or gamma methods to calculate a Categorical POD for HMM states such as POD-1, we calculate α ♦ or γ ♦ , respectively, using an instance value of speed (e.g., speed = 42) based on the assertion. More specifically, given an RV computation Con, the calculation of P(Con1) and P(Con2) (discussed in Sect. 3.3) is modified as follows. If condition t is hidden, as in Speed≤42 in the modified assertion of Fig. 1 
A comparison of hybrid-monitoring techniques
To evaluate the benefit of our proposed monitoring approach, we compare it to alternative monitoring techniques for information streams that contain both visible and hidden artifacts. Using the standard formal-languages approach, we show a case where one technique fails to detect a pattern the other is capable of detecting.
We compared our weighted-probabilistic assertion architecture approach (of Fig. 4 ) with the following two architectures for RV of systems with hidden information:
• The first alternative architecture, denoted the deterministic assertion architecture, resembles that of Fig. 4 , but has the HMM connected to a purely deterministic formalspecification assertions, instead of a weighted probabilistic module described in Sect. 3.3. In other words, this is the architecture of Fig. 4 , where the Formal Specification Assertion block implements assertions using a conventional deterministic implementation, such as the one described in [2] .
• The second alternative architecture, denoted the monolithic architecture, contains no standalone RV module. Rather, the HMM itself, being a probabilistic state machine, performs the RV tasks. With this approach, the assertions are combined with the symbol decoding HMM inducing a much larger HMM. (i) ). However, the following example demonstrates the weakness of this approach. Consider the TLC scenario depicted in Fig. 9a . Using the above-mentioned single sequence method induces the sequence seq 1 of hidden states depicted in Fig. 9b , with probability P1 = δ T (seq 1 ) = 9.677258147046034E − 7. Given lightsTurnedGreen occurring at time t = 25 and no lightsTurnedRed occurring before time t = 200, then this sequence conforms to R1 because it has no contiguous 2-min interval with Speed = HIGH.
In contrast, given the same lightsTurnedGreen and lightsTurnedRed timing sequence, sequence seq 2 of state symbols depicted in Fig. 9c violates requirement R1 because it contains two consecutive minutes of Speed=HIGH (starting at t = 25) while lights are green, with no subsequent red light before t = 25 + 120 + 30 = 175. Its probability is P2 = T (seq 2 ) = 4.639731359753094E − 11. Sequence seq 2 is not generated by the single sequence method because its probability is smaller than P2.
Consequently, the single sequence method fails to discover the possibility of a sequence (seq 2 ) that violates R1. When used for mission and safety critical systems, such as missile tracking, it is useful to know about the existence of sequences that violate requirements, even if they occur with a lower probability.
A comparison with the monolithic architecture
The second alternative architecture, denoted the monolithic architecture, contains no standalone RV module. Rather, the HMM itself, being a probabilistic state machine, performs the RV tasks.
With this approach, the assertions are combined with the symbol decoding HMM inducing a much larger HMM. There is no published literature about a monolithic hybrid HMMbased RV method. Therefore, our comments are abstract in nature.
Two primary drawbacks of the monolithic approach are:
(a) The overall monitoring system is hard to read and maintain; with no separation of concerns within the HMM, it is effectively performing two distinct jobs: (1) decoding hidden symbols from visible ones, and (2) monitoring or verifying a requirement such as R1 or R2. (b) The HMM is the monolithic architecture, being larger and harder to read and will be harder to learn using the experimental approach discussed in Sect. 3.2. 
Conclusion and future work
We have demonstrated a technique for performing RV in the presence of hidden evidence. We showed how the hybrid HMM-based RV technique is capable of detecting low probability scenarios that pose a risk to system safety or to mission success, which are goals important enough to be concerned about failures with a probability lower than 0.5. The paper describes the hybrid RV algorithm as well as several techniques for computing the on-going probability distribution of the hidden symbols used as inputs to the RV model.
Clearly, comprehensive experimental results are needed in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the technique described in this paper. However, a fully automated tool-set is absent; such an effort will be slow, expensive, and error prone. Therefore, we are currently building a special StateRover code-generator that automates the technique described in this paper.
We plan to apply this technique to the verification of aerospace applications, in which the evidence is provided as telemetry files that often do not contain the artifacts asserted about by the formal specifications. We also plan to apply this technique to automatic pattern detection within large volumes of cyber data, in an effort to identify malicious or dangerous behavioral patterns.
